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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
EUGENE MYERS,
Defendant-AppeUant.

Case No.

12733

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Eugene Myers appeals from a verdict of guilty of
the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable R. W. Garff found the defendant
guilty of the charge of contributing to the delinquency
of a minor. The defendant was sentenced to six months
in the Salt Lake County Jail.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the conviction.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Responding to a call on June 13, 1970, police officers
went to Scotty's Motel to assist a Mrs. Beebe in locating
her twelve year old daughter who had run away from
home (T. 11, 12). The officers knocked on the door of
room 19 and upon gaining admittance through the consent of its occupants, they noticed a bag of what appeared
to be marijuana laying on a nightstand in the room (T.
13). The marijuana was seized and the defendant was
charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor
(T. 18, 83). Counsel was appointed for the defendant
who represented him at the preliminary hearing and at
the first of two days of trial, (T. 2, 3, 26) but failed to
appear for the second day of trial (T. 71). The defen·
dant was free on bail and was in attendance at the preliminary hearing (T. 3), but did not attend either day
of his trial (T. 26, 71).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN
THE SEIZURE AND ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE AT HIS TRIAL, AS OBJECTS FALLING IN THE PLAIN VIEW OF AN OFFICER
WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO BE IN A POSITION TO HAVE THAT VIEW ARE SUB,JECT TO SEIZURE AND MAY BE INTRODUCED AS EVIDENCE.
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The foregoing contention was confirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Harris
v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 992, 390 U. S. 234, 19 L. Ed.
2d 1067 ( 1968) , wherein the Court stated:

"It has long been settled that objects falling
in the plain view of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be introduced in evidence. Ker
v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 42, 43 (1963); United
States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559 (1927); Hester v.
United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924) ." Id. at 993.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this basic
constitutional principle in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U. S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971) as it stated:
"What the plain view cases have in common
is that the police officer in each of them had a
prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused." Id. at 2038.
The plain view doctrine is based on the logical notion
that where an officer can observe and seize evidence without having to look for it, he has not conducted a "search"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
In State v. Allred, 16 Utah 2d 41, 395 P. 2d 535
(1964), the Utah Supreme Court stated,
"No search was necessary for the officer to
find these articles, they being fully disclosed to
his view when he approached the car. Under such
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circumstances, where no search is required the
constitutional guaranty is not applicable." Id. at
537.
In the recent case of State v. Martinez, 23 Utah 2d
62, 457 P. 2d 613 (1969), an officer had gone to a suspect's
home to ask him to appear in a lineup and was invited
in to speak to the suspect. The Utah Supreme Court
found that his observation and seizure of an item of evidence laying on a chair within his view was not an unlawful search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
In its opinion, the court declared:
" . . . no search under the constitution interdiction takes place when items having evidentiary
value are (1) outside a building and in plain view,
or (2) they are in plain sight inside a building to
which access has been lawfully gained." Id. at
615 Note 5.
A number of other Utah decisions also support the
plain view doctrine. See State v. Knapp, 28 Utah 2d 258,
501 P. 2d 264 (1972), State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318,
495 P. 2d 1259 (1972), State v. Martinez, 28 Utah 2d 80,
498 P. 2d 651 (1972), State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 129,
499 P. 2d 276 (1972).
As the following facts indicate, the present case falls
squarely within the plain view doctrine as (1) the police
officers had a right to be in the motel room where the
marijuana was found and (2) the bag of marijuana was
within the plain view of the officers once they had entered
the room. No search of the motel room was ever con·
ducted.
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The record shows that the police officers went to the
motel where the marijuana was found in re::;ponse to a
call from a Mrs. Beebe (T. 11). The officers met Mrs.
Beebe near the motel where she informed them that her
daughter, Lynn Beebe, age 12, had run away from home
and that according to information she had received, Lynn
wc:.s in a room at the motel (T. 12). The officers confirmed the information received by Mrs. Beebe (T. 13),
and also called their dispatcher to confirm that Lynn was,
in fact, a runaway (T. 14). They then proceeded to the
motel room and knocked on the door which was opened
by one of the occupants of the room (T. 13). Looking
through the open door, the officers observed two girls on
the bed in the room and asked Mrs. Beebe to approach
and observe the girls. Once she had identified one of them
as her daughter, the officers entered the room (T. 13)
to assist in taking custody of the child (T. 16). There
is nothing in the record to indicate that the occupants of
the room did not consent to such entry by the policemen.
Once inside, one of the policemen observed what appeared
to be a part of a lid of marijuana lying in plain view on
a nightstand in the room (T. 13). Although there is some
confusion as to who actually placed the appellant, Myers,
under arrest, the officers agreed that he was placed under
arrest and the marijuana was then seized (T. 18, 83). A
review of the record reveals that during the trial, the defendant, two police officers, and three occupants of the
motel room testified as witnesses. Each of them was
asked to state the whereabouts of the marijuana when
it was observed by the police. Every one of them, with
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the exception of the defendant, testified that the marijuana was on the night stand open to the view of the
officers (T. 18, 48, 55, 63, 76, 89, 84).
Clearly, the record establishes that (1) the officers
were rightfully within the motel room and that (2) the
marijuana which was seized as evidence was in the plain
view of the officers. The plain view doctrine applies and
there was, therefore, no illegal search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.

POINT II.
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN
CONTINUING THE TRIAL IN DE FEN DANT'S ABSENCE, AS VOLUNTARY ABSENCE CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF THE
RIGHT TO BE PRESENT.
Respondent contends that appellant's voluntary absence from the trial constituted a waiver of his right to
be present and he cannot now complain.
Appellant cites Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574, 4 S'. Ct.
202 (1884), as authority for the proposition that a defendant cannot waive his right to be present at trial by
his voluntary absence. Although that may be true for
cases involving capital offenses, as was Hopt, supra, it is
not true of noncapital cases. Capital cases are in a class
by themselves (see below). Furthermore, the defendant
in Hopt, supra, was not free on bail but was held in custody and his absence from the trial was not voluntary.
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The general rule in both the state and federal courts
is set forth in Di.az v. United States, 223 U. S. 442, 32 S.
Ct. 250 (1911). The defendant in that case was on trial
for homicide, a noncapital offense, and was free on bail.
On two different occasions he voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings of the trial. Later, on appeal,
he claimed that continuing the trial in his absence constituted a violation of his constitutional rights. In affirming his conviction, the Supreme Court held that in noncapital cases, voluntary absence by a defendant constitutes a waiver of his right to be present. Id. at 254.
Appellant also cites State v. Mannion, 19 Utah 505,
57 P. 542 (1899), as authority for the notion that the
right to be present at trial may not be voluntarily waived.
That, however, was not the issue in Mannion, supra. In
that case, the defendant did not voluntarily absent himself from the trial, but was removed by court order. The
Mannion, supra, decision, therefore, is not authority for
the issue presented in this case.
The case of State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 51 P. 2d
1052 (1935), makes it clear that Utah follows the general
rule. It is important to note that Aikers, supra, was decided after both Hopt, supra, and Mannion, supra, which
are cited by appellant. In the Aikers, supra, case, the defendant was charged with robbery, but was free on bail.
The commencement of the proceedings had to be delayed
for several days past the date set for trial, so there was
some uncertainty as to when Aikers should appear in
court. When the case was called for trial, Aikers could
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not be found and the first part of the trial was held with
the defendant absent. On appeal, Aikers claimed that
the commencement of the proceedings without his presence constituted a violation of his constitutional rights.
In denyi.11g his appeal, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
". . . The defendant may by conduct or in
words, waive such right, and that he may not
advantage of his voluntary absence, if he is at
liberty on bail, during some part of the proceedings at which it is his duty as well as his right to
be in attendance." Id. at 1055.

Aikers, supra, makes it clear that a defendant who
is free on bail but does not appear at trial is deemed to
have waived his right t:o be present. It also establishes
that it need not be shown that the defendant actually
knew of the exact date and time of the trial. The trial
court was placed under no duty t:o seek out the defendant
and bring him t:o trial, but the responsibility was on the
defendant who knew his trial was about t:o be called up
to maize himself available at the time the trial commenced. The appellant in the present case had much
better notice than did Aikers. He was present at the preliminary hearing (R. 3) when his trial date was set for
November 6, 1970 (R. 25), and his trial commenced on
that date. He was free on bail and his failure to appear
on that date was clearly voluntary. Furthermore, he had
counsel appointed for him who was aware of all subsequent proceedings and could have informed him of them
had Myers made himself available to be contacted. It
was Myers' legal duty to be present at his trial and as the
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court said in Aikers, supra, a defendant will not be permitted to take advantage of his own misconduct. Id. at
1056.
The general rule set forth in Diaz, supra, and Aikers,
supra, is so well established that it has been adopted as
part of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (See 18
U.S. C. A. Rule 43).
An examination of the case law of the various states
throughout the country makes it clear that this general
rule is 2.lso adopted by the most majority of state courts.
The following are but a few recent examples of such dec1s10ns. State v. Tacon, 488 P. 2d 973, 107 Ariz. 353
(1971), Hanley v. State, 434 P. 2d 440, 83 Nev. 461
(1937). McKinney v. Commonwealth, 474 S. W. 2d 384
(Kentucky 1971), Commonwealth v. Flemmi, 277 N. E.
2d 523 (Mass. 1971), State v. Stockton, 185 S. E. 2d 459
(N. C. 1971). People v. Teitelbaum, 329 P. 2d 157 (Cal.
1957), Wilson v. State, 90 S. E. 2d 557 (Ga. 1955), State
v. Utecht, 36 N. W. 2d 126 (Minn. 1949), Commonwealth
v. Diehl, 107 A. 2d 543 (Pa. 1954).
It should also be noted that appellant was on trial
for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a misdemeanor (see Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-51 (1953). Utah
Code Ann. § 77-27-3 (1953) provides in part, " ... but
if for a misdemeanor, the trial may be had in the absence
of the defendant . . . " It is clear that this statute expressly allows for misdemeanor cases to be held without
the defendant present.
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POINT III.
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION WAS NOT INVALID BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF
COUNSEL TO APPEAR FOR PART OF HIS
TRIAL AS APPELLANT WAS ON TRIAL
FOR A MISDEMEANOR AND, THEREFORE, HAD NO RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
Although in the recent decision of Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed 2d 530 (1972), the United
States Supreme Court extended the right to counsel t.o
cases involving misdemeanors, it is important to note that
appellant's trial was held before that case was decided.
This case should, therefore, be decided in accordance
with the law as it existed prior to Argersinger, supra.
Appellant was on trial for the crime of contributing
to the delinquency of a minor, a misdemeanor. Utah Code
Ann. § 55-10-51 (1953). The maximum term of imprison·
ment which he could have received for that offense was
six months in the county jail. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-16
(1953). The controlling law in this case is Utah Code
Ann. § 77-64-2 (Supp. 1969) and it states that the right
to counsel shall only apply to those persons who are,
"Charged with a crime in which the penalty to be im·
posed could be confinement for more than six months."
It is clear, therefor, that appellant could not have been
deprived of his right to counsel in this case, because ac·
cording to the law as it existed at the time of his trial,
he had no such right.
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POINT IV.
THE DECISION OF ilRGERSINGER V.
HAMLIN, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530
(1972) SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.
Appellant contends that Argersinger, supra, which
grants the right to appointed counsel to indigents accused
of misdemeanors, is controlling in this case because it was
meant to be applied retroactively. Appellant errs in making such an assumption, as a careful reading of that opinion reveals nothing which would indicate the intent that
it be given retroactive application. The question of retroactive application appears to have been consciously ignored and thereby left to the lower federal and state
courts to decide individually.
The question of the retroactive application of Supreme Court decisions is discussed at some length in the
case of Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 86
S. Ct. 1772 (1966) . The issue in that case was the retroactive application of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436,
86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S.
478, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964). In deciding that question, the
Court laid down the criteria for determining whether a
decision should be applied retroactively. The Court began its discussion of such criteria by stressing, "That the
choice between retroactivity and no retroactivity in no
way turns on the value of the constitutional guarantee
involved." Id. at 1778. It went on to state:
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"W c:Zso stress that the retroactivity or nonof a rule is not automatically determined by the provision of the Constitution on
which the dictate is based. Each constitutional
rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct
functions, its own background of precedent and
its own impact on the administration of
and the way in which these factors combine must
inevitably vary with the dictate involved. Accordingly as Linkletter and Tehan suggest, we must
determine retroactivity 'in each case' by !oohing
to the peculiar traits of the specific 'rule in question.'" 381 U. S., at 629, 85 S. Ct., at 1737; 382
U. S., at 410, 86 S. Ct., at 461. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 1778.
Appellant contends that because Gideon v. Wain·
wright, 372 U. S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963), also dealt with
the right to counsel and was found retroactive, Arger·
singer must also be applied retroactively. The foregoing
statements from Johnson, supra, make it clear, however,
that such is not the case. Those statements point out
that retroactivity must be decided case by case and that
just because the right to counsel, or any other constitu·
tional guarantee is involved, the issue of retroactivity is
not automatically resolved.
The Court went on to say that in deciding constitu·
tional issues, the question is largely one of degree. Id.
at 1779. Gideon, supra, dealt with the denial of the right
to counsel in felony cases. It is likely that it was found
retroactive because of the serious degree to which the
constitutional right had been abused, whereas Argersinger
dealt with misdemeanors, and the denial was of a lesser
degree.
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In the Johnson decision, the Court held that where
the states had relied substantially upon previous law to
establish their statutes and policies, retroactivity was not
in order. It found that the serious disruption of the administration of our criminal laws which would have result8d from the retrial or release of numerous prisoners
found guilty under previously announced standards, dictated against retroactive application. Id. at 1780.
This rule would also apply to Argersinger, although
it didn't apply to Gideon. When the Court in Gideon
established that there was a right to counsel in all felony
cases, very few states were not already recognizing such
a right. On the other hand, the A. rgersinger decision came
as a surpr:se. Most of the states, acting in reliance on
Gideon's application of the right only to felony cases, had
not provided for appointed counsel in cases involving
petty offenses. A retroactive application of the Argersinger decision would cause a serious disruption of the
administration of the criminal law.
Finally, the Court in Johnson, supra, stressed that
Miranda, supra, and Escobedo, supra, were not applied
retroactively because of the unjustifiable burden it would
place on the Court. Id. at 1781. That is clearly the case
here. Our courts are already hard pressed to keep up
with the large number of misdemeanor cases already on
their dockets. To require them in addition to rehear the
many previous trials which Argersinger would invalidate
would be an unjustifiable burden on them.
The three opinions concurring with the Argersinger
decision in which six of the justices join, are mainly de-
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voted to discussing the additional burden which the decision will place on the courts. They make it clear that
although they expect compliance with their decision, they
do not want to unduly tax the already overburdened
courts. It is evident that none of them anticipate retroactive application.
POINT V.
GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT DID NOT EXTEND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL TO INDIGENT MISDEMEANANTS.

Appellant would also contend that even if Argersinger is not retroactive, Gideon v. Wainwright, supra,
is controlling in that it granted the right to counsel in misdemeanor as well as felony cases.
The following cases, however, clearly establish that
this contention is erroneous.
The right to counsel in misdemeanor cases within
the State of Utah was recently decided in Hortenci,o v.
Fillis, 25 Utah 2d 73, 475 P. 2d 1011 (1970). A unanimous
Utah Supreme Court held that the ruling in Gideon did
not apply to misdemeanors.
J us tic Marshall in speaking for a unanimous court
in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), said:

"In Gideon v. Wainwright ... however, Betts
was overruled and this court held that the Sixth
Amendment as applied through the Due
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was applicable to the States and, accordingly, that there was
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an absolute right to appointment of counsel in
fewny cases." Id. at 134. (Emphasis added.)
This clearly indicates that the Court intended the ruling
in Gideon to be so limited. Also see In re Gault, 387 U. S'.
1 (1967), where the Court said that Gault would be entitled to have the state provide counsel for him if a felony
were involved if his parents were unable to afford counsel.
The most recent evidence that Gideon applies only
to felon'.es is the following statement from Justice Powell's
concurring opinion in Argersinger.
"Gideon v. Wainwright (Citation omitted)
held that the states were required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all indigent defendants charged
with fewnies." Id. at 2016. (Emphasis added.)

POINT VI.
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT APPELLANT HAD A RIGHT TO COUNSEL, HE
WAS NOT DENIED THAT RIGHT IN THE
C 0 N ST ITU TI 0 NA L SENSE, AS THE
COURT APPOINTED AN ATTORNEY FOR
HIM AND COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO APPEAR CANNOT BE CONSTRUED AS CONSTITUTING STATE ACTION.
The record shows that counsel was appointed for the
appellant (T. 2). His counsel was present at the preliminary hearing (T. 3), at sentencing (T. 88) and at the
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first of two days of trial (T. 26). The second day of trial
was set for November 19, 1970 (T. 70), however, at the
request of appellant's counsel it was continued until Jan.
uary 29, 1971 (T. 2). On that date, counsel failed to ap.
pear (T. 71). She made no effort to contact the court or
request a continuance, but merely called opposing counsel
on the morning of the trial and said that she was too busy
to come (T. 71). It is evident that the lack of counsel for
the appellant on the second day of trial was in no way the
fault of the trial court.
It is well established that constitutional guarantees
provide protection only against state, rather than private
action. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18 (1883).
It follows then that the failure of counsel to appear could
only be construed as a denial of the right to counsel in
the constitutional sense if such nonappearance was due
to some form of state action. The record makes it clear
that counsel's failure to appear was not the fault of the
trial court, or any other state entity, but occurred solely
because of her own personal neglect. The court's have
consistently held that the actions of counsel (even ap·
pointed counsel from the public defenders' office), which
result in the loss of a client's constitutional rights, do not
constitute state action. See Espinoza v. Rogers, et al.,
No. 72-1667 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1973), Thomas v. Howard,
455 F. 2d 228 (3d Cir. 1972), United States, ex rel. Wood
v. Blocher, 335 F. Supp. 43 (D. C. N. J. 1971), United
States, ex rel. Wilkins v. Banmiller, 325 F. 2d 514 (3d Cir.
1963), Peake v. Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 853 (E. D. Pa.
1968).
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It appears, therefore, that any loss of appellant's
right to counsel was the result of private rather than state
action, and the Sixth Amendment does not apply.

POINT VII.
IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S DISCRETION TO HEAR A PORTION OF THE TRIAL WHILE COUNSEL
WAS NOT PRESENT.
The case of State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P. 2d
887 (1957), establishes that counsel need not be present
at all stages of a criminal trial. The defendant in that
case, was on trial for robbery and portions of testimony
were allowed to be read to the jury while defendant's
counsel was absent. In affirming the conviction, the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
"While it was necessary for the defendant to
be present at all stages of the trial, there is no absolute requirement that an attorney be there ...
"In the absence of any showing of disadvantage to the defendant in the procedure followed,
it was no abuse of discretion nor variance from
proper procedure for the trial court to have the
testimony read to the jury without insisting that
defendant's counsel be present." Id. at 890. (Emphasis added.)
Allowing the trial court to proceed in the absence
of counsel when in its sound discretion it finds justification for doing so, only makes good sense. Otherwise the
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defendant and his counsel could continually delay the
proceeding of the trial by simply failing to appear.
It is important to note that appellant does not contend that his trial was unfair or that the court allowed
opposing counsel to in any way take advantage of the
absence of appellant's counsel.
It should also be remembered that appellant did not
appear at his own trial and it is difficult to conceive that
the law should require counsel to be present where the
defendant himself, does not care enough to make an
appearance.

CONCLUSION
The evidence used in the appellant's trial was lawfully obtained. Although he was not present at a portion
of his trial, he waived that right by his voluntary absence
and he was not wrongfully denied the right to counsel.
Respondent respectfully submits, therefore, that the
judgment of the lower court be affirmed.
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